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INTRODUCTION 
For over a decade, international attention has focused on corporate 
accountability and financial reporting standards.1 Initially, corporations 
that wanted to achieve high standards of corporate governance were 
encouraged to voluntarily comply with non-binding corporate governance 
codes. These codes included provisions that governed “recognized best 
practices” as well as disclosure requirements such as listing regulations. 
Over time, however, the persistent demand for corporate accountability 
and transparency led to an evolution from a voluntary notion of corporate 
 
 
 * The author is a Fulbright Scholar pursuing his Doctor of Juridical Sciences (S.J.D.) at 
Georgetown University Law Center. He received his Master of Laws (LL.M.) from Washington 
University School of Law and LL.B. (Honors) from International Islamic University, Islamabad, 
Pakistan (www.law.georgetown.edu/fellows/aai5). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’s Second Annual Conference on Corporate 
Governace, June 3–4, 2005. 
 1. See ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9 (1992). 
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governance to one in which corporations have a legal duty to “comply or 
explain.”2 
To enforce standards of accountability and transparency, national 
governments have enacted various forms of legislation. In the United 
States, for example, Congress passed the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,3 
which is considered a legislative milestone in the formative history of 
corporate governance. Pakistan’s legislature, on the other hand, delegated 
the task of issuing a corporate governance code to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), which enacted Pakistan’s 
Code of Corporate Governance4 (the Code) in 2002.  
The Code was met with criticism from corporations and commentators. 
Corporations believed that complying with the Code’s provisions would 
be very expensive. They also argued that there were numerous practical 
difficulties in implementing and enforcing the Code. Indeed, one of the 
legitimate problems pointed out by corporations was the lack of relevant 
expertise in Pakistan to enforce the Code’s provisions. In addition, some 
commentators believed that the Code was defective, outdated, and had “no 
utility to stakeholders.”5  
However, despite these criticisms, the Code in many ways has been 
ground-breaking, ushering in a new era of corporate governance in 
Pakistan. The Code is continually developing and evolving through the 
interpretation of its provisions by the courts and the substantial revisions 
made to the Code itself by the SECP. Pakistan’s courts, for the most part, 
have not significantly criticized the Code’s provisions in the last three 
years.6 However, the courts have shown an unprecedented concern for the 
welfare of minority shareholders and have been willing to annul the 
decisions of majority shareholders in certain cases.7 In addition, the SECP 
 
 
 2. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., DEREK HIGGS REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ¶ 1.14, at 16 (2003) (“Listed companies have to report on how they apply 
the Code’s principles and to state whether they comply with the detailed provisions and, if not, why 
not. This approach has worked well.”). 
 3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in sections of 11 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.). 
 4. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N PAK., CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERANCE (2002) [hereinafter THE 
CODE]. 
 5. Khalil Ahmed, Shortcomings in Corporate Governance Code—II, THE BUSINESS RECORDER, 
Sept. 8, 2004, at 19. 
 6. One exception is when the Sindh High Court accepted a company’s right to continue with its 
external auditor, as opposed to the Code, which requires a change of auditors every five years. See THE 
CODE, supra note 4, at cl. xli. 
 7. These matters tend to arise out of minority shareholders’ objections to swap-rationing 
determined in schemes of arrangement for proposed mergers. See generally In re: Pfizer Laboratories 
Limited, 2003 CLD 1209; Kohinoor Raiwind Mills Limited v. Kohinoor Gujjar Khan Mills Limited, 
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appears to be substantially revising the Code to facilitate and complement 
the process of implementing capital market reforms to attract even more 
foreign investors. 
This Paper outlines the legal superstructure governing corporations in 
Pakistan. It identifies problems with the current legal regime and makes 
recommendations for future reforms.  
OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME 
Pakistan has a multifaceted corporate governance regime. Laws fall 
into one of the following six categories: 
1. General corporate laws8  
2. Rules and regulations made under corporate laws9 
3. Stock exchanges’ listing regulations and bylaws 
4. Civil laws, including those that provide remedies for seeking 
declarations, enforcement of a claim, and recovery10 
 
 
2002 CLD 1314. 
 8. E.g., The Companies Profits (Workers’ Participation) Act, 1968; The Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance, 1969; The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) 
Ordinance (V of 1970), Gaz. Pak. Feb. 26, 1970. The Workers’ Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971; The 
Companies (Appointment of Legal Advisors) (X of 1974) Gaz. Pak. Mar. 5, 1974; The Companies 
Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) Gaz Pak. 1984; The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act 
(XLII of 1997), Gaz. Pak. Dec. 26, 1997; The Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting 
Shares and Takeovers) Ordinance, 2002. 
 9. E.g., The Companies Profits (Workers’ Participation) Rules, 1971; The Investment 
Companies and Investment Advisers Rules, 1971 Gaz. Pak. Mar. 12, 1972; The Companies 
(Appointment of Trustees) Rules, 1973 Gaz. Pak. May 14, 1973; The Companies (Appointment of 
Legal Advisers) Rules, 1975 Gaz. Pak. Apr. 2, 1975; The Monopoly Control Authority (Net Worth of 
Stocks and Shares) Rules, 1977 Gaz. Pak. Aug. 25, 1977; The Companies (General Provisions and 
Forms) Rules, 1985 Gaz. Pak. Dec. 14, 1985; The Companies (Registration Offices) Regulations, 
1986; The Companies (Invitation and Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1987 Gaz. Pak. Sept. 26, 1987; 
The Companies (Management by Administrator) Rules, 1993 Gaz. Pak. Nov. 8, 1993; The Asset 
Management Companies Rules, 1995 Gaz. Pak. May 15, 1995; The Credit Rating Companies Rules, 
1995 Gaz. Pak. Jul 26, 1995; S.R.O. No.(I)/95; The Monopoly Control Authority (Supply of 
Information) Rules, 1995 Gaz. Pak. Nov. 8, 1995, S.R.O. No. 75 (I); The Monopoly Control Authority 
(Value of Assets) Rules, 1995; Venture Capital Companies and Venture Capital Funds Rules, 2001 
Gaz. Pak. S.R.O. No. 131(I)/2001; S.R.O. No. 107(I), 195; The Companies (Issue of Capital) Rules, 
1996 S.R.O. No. 110(I) 96; The Employees’ Provident Fund (Investment in Listed Securities) Rules, 
1996 Gaz. Pak. Feb 26, 1996, S.R.O. No. (I)/96; The Monopoly Control Authority (Computation of 
Market Shares) Rules, 1996 Gaz. Pak. Aug. 8, 1996, S.R.O. No. 108 (KE) 96; The Companies (Issue 
of Capital) Rules, 1997; The Companies (Audit of Cost Accounts) Rules, 1998 Gaz. Pak. S.R.O. No. 
846(I)/98; S.R.O. No.,(I)/98; The Companies (Asset Backed Securitization) Rules, 1999 Gaz. Pak. 
Dec. 14, 1999; S.R.O. No. 1338 (I)/99; The Companies (Buy-back of Shares) Rules, 1999 Gaz. Pak. 
Dec. 14, 1999; S.R.O. No. 1337 (I)/99.; The Companies (Rehabilitation of Sick Industrial Unities) 
Rules, 1999; The Companies Share Capital (Variation in Rights and Privileges) Rules, 2000. 
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5. Criminal laws for breaches of trust, fraud, etc.11 
6. Special prosecution under the National Accountability Ordinance, 
1999 for corporate fraud and misappropriation12 
Viewing the relevant laws, along with SECP’s vision,13 offers the 
foundational perspective to understanding Pakistan’s corporate governance 
superstructure. Isolated reforms in any one of the above categories of laws 
are not likely to ensure the expected results.14 
Business Ethics—Islamic Considerations  
The SECP believes that the best way to promote the interests of all 
corporate stakeholders is to ensure that business is conducted in 
accordance with the highest prevailing ethical standards.15  
[C]orporate governance does not exist in isolation but draws upon 
basic principles and values which are expected to permeate all 
human dealings, including business dealings principles such as 
utmost good faith, trust, competency, professionalism, transparency 
and accountability, and the list can go on. Corporate governance 
builds upon these basic assumptions and demands from human 
dealings and adopts and refines them to the complex web of 
relationships and interests which make up a corporation.16 
Pakistan draws ethics principles primarily from Islamic law because 
the Constitution mandates that all laws conform to Islam.17 The SECP’s 
 
 
 10. E.g., The Specific Relief Act, 1877; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; The Limitation Act, 
1908. 
 11. E.g., Pakistan Penal Code, 1860; The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. 
 12. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 19–25. 
 13. See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N PAK., MANUAL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶ 2.2, at 3 
(2004) [hereinafter MANUAL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].  
 14. See generally id. § III, at 12–16. 
 15. Id. ¶ 2.1, at 3.  
 16. Id. ¶ 2.2, at 3. 
 17. Article 2-A of the Annex to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the 
Objectives Resolution) and article 227 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 
explicitly incorporate Islam into the Constitution. Article 2-A of the Annex states: 
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as 
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed; Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order 
their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and 
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. CONST. ISLAMIC REPUB. 
PAK., Annex, art. 2-A (1985). 
Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan states in part: 
All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/4
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position on fiduciary duties is based on Anglo-American common law 
and, importantly, Islamic law, which shows the significance of Islam on 
business ethics for the corporate governance in Pakistan.18  
The Accountability Ordinance 
The National Accountability Ordinance (“the Ordinance”) was 
introduced in 1999 to eradicate corruption and corrupt practices by public 
officers who misappropriate public money.19 Section Nine defines 
“corruption and corrupt practices”:  
[A] holder of public office, or any other person, is said to commit or 
to have committed the offense of corruption and corruption 
practices . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or 
otherwise converts for his own use, or for the use of any other 
person, any property entrusted to him, or under his control, or 
willfully allows any other person so to do[.]20 
Section Five defines “person”: 
[I]n the case of a company or a body corporate, the sponsors, 
Chairman, Chief Executive, Managing Director, elected Directors 
by whatever name called, and guarantors of the company or body 
corporate or any one exercising direction or control of the affairs of 
such company or a body corporate.21  
This definition of “person” extends the scope of “corruption and 
corrupt practices” to corporate frauds and misappropriations.22 If corporate 
management is successfully prosecuted for corruption and corrupt 
practices, pursuant to special prosecution before the Accountability 
 
 
the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law 
shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions. 
CONST. ISLAMIC REPUB. PAK. art. 227(1) (1973). 
 18. See generally MANUAL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, §§ 6.19–6.26, at 32–
39. 
 19. National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (XVIII of 1999), pmbl. [hereinafter The 
Ordinance]. 
 20. Id. § 9(a)(iii). 
 21. Id. § 5(o). 
 22. Id. 
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Courts, management may face up to fourteen years of imprisonment, pay 
fines, and have property that was misappropriated or obtained through 
corruption and corrupt practices confiscated.23 Under the Ordinance, 
imposed fines shall not be less than the gain derived by the accused from 
the commission of the offense.24 
The Ordinance is the first legislation in Pakistan to treat public officers 
the same as corporate management for prosecution purposes. The Supreme 
Court of Pakistan already considers a public company office to be a public 
office and has therefore entertained constitutional petitions for the 
issuance of the writ of quo-warranto.25 
CURRENT CHALLENGES AND SUGGESTED MEASURES 
Ownership Structure, Common Law, and Civil Law 
Unlike the Berle & Means model of separation of ownership and 
control, Pakistan’s dominant corporate ownership structure resembles a 
concentrated family ownership structure. Majority shareholders not only 
retain control of a company but also are engaged in managing it.  
Because of Pakistan’s common law background, the country’s legal 
system resembles the Anglo-American model; however, Pakistan’s 
ownership structure is the opposite of the Anglo-American structure of 
dispersed ownership. The issuance of the Code ignores this distinction and 
benefits from the U.K. and South African reform initiatives.26  
Corporate governance mechanisms devised for markets with dispersed 
ownership may not offer the right cure for the governance issues that a 
concentrated ownership structure may cause. A regulatory response will be 
more informed if it also takes into consideration East-Asian reform 
initiatives, even though some East-Asian countries have civil law 
traditions. For instance, a regulatory analysis of family ownership 
structures in the capital markets of Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea 
may provide insights into similar governance issues arising out of 
concentrated ownership structures, and may thus be helpful in devising 
better solutions and in achieving higher standards of corporate governance. 
 
 
 23. Id. § 10. 
 24. Id. § 11. 
 25. See generally Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd. PLD, 1975 SC 244. 
 26. See, e.g., MANUAL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 1. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan acknowledged that its Code of Corporate Governance “draws upon 
the experiences of . . . countries with a common law tradition” and expressly referred to reports and 
recommendations from the U.K. and South Africa.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/4
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Minority Shareholders 
Under the Companies Ordinance, 1984,27 the minimum threshold for 
seeking a remedy from the Court against mismanagement and oppression 
requires that at least twenty percent of the shareholders initiate a 
complaint.28 Shareholders representing at least ten percent but less than 
twenty percent of the company’s shares can apply to the SECP to appoint 
an inspector to investigate the company’s affairs.29 Because neither the 
Companies Ordinance nor the Code recognizes shareholders who represent 
less than ten percent of the company’s shares (the minority shareholds),30 
no analogous provision exists for these shareholders. 
Minority shareholders can enforce their claims in civil cases by suing 
for tortious loss in accordance with general laws.31 Claimants routinely 
seek interim and permanent injunctive relief against management. Pending 
final adjudication of the matter, interim relief is invariably granted, thus 
hindering a company’s business.32 
To provide minority shareholders with an effective remedy while 
minimizing interference with a company’s business, an internal grievance 
and redress mechanism should be considered for listed companies. The 
SECP should establish a “grievance and redress committee” consisting of 
executive and independent directors and formulate a list of maintainable 
grievances. Furthermore, the SECP should expand quasi-judicial functions 
of the stock exchanges by granting minority shareholders an appellate 
remedy before a frontline regulator, and thereafter to the SECP.  
To make reports and disclosures more reliable, the SECP should 
encourage minority shareholders to report any noncompliance directly to 
an audit committee and to the relevant stock exchange. Legal protections 
for whistleblowers, that is, corporate managers and employees, will help 
establish an additional monitoring system over the controlling majority.  
 
 
 27. Companies Ordinance, 1984 (XLVII of 1984). 
 28. Id. § 290. 
 29. Id. § 263. 
 30. Id. In addition, section 290 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, maintains that minority 
shareholders who represent less than ten percent do not have standing to file a petition to the court for 
mismanagement and minority oppression.  
 31. For the laws that regulate the filing of civil actions in general, see sources cited supra note 
10. For a list pertaining to special remedies for specific corporate and securities laws, see sources cited 
supra note 8.  
 32. Actions of this nature are ordinarily adjudicated in four to six years at the Court of First 
Instance. Interlocutory appeals may take longer. 
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Expansion of Audit Committee—Legal Expertise 
The introduction of internal and external audit mechanisms are the 
most prominent achievements of the evolution and development of global 
corporate governance initiatives, and the SECP has tried to incorporate 
these international developments into the Code.  
Generally, the primary function of an internal audit committee is to 
assist a company’s Board of Directors,33 while the external audit 
committee addresses the concerns of the shareholders at large.34 In both 
cases, the audit committees can only offer financial and accounting 
expertise. Because internal and external audit committees lack legal 
expertise, they cannot ensure that a company’s affairs are managed in 
accordance with the applicable laws. 
The Code requires companies not only to comply with the provisions 
of the Code and Companies Ordinance, but also to certify that they are in 
compliance.35 A proper certification as to compliance with the Companies 
Ordinance and the Code can only be done on the basis of professional 
legal advice.  
The Code should require the certification and actual compliance with 
all applicable laws, not just those of the Code and the Companies 
Ordinance. Although such compliance would expand the scope of the 
corporate governance regime, this expansion would remain consistent with 
the purposes for which the issuance of the Code was considered 
appropriate.36 Such certification will improve adherence to Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) policies by companies. Accordingly, the 
Code will become instrumental in introducing CSR to listed companies, 
making them more attractive to local and international investors. In 
addition, compliance with a broader legal certification requirement would 
discourage transactions between associated companies. 
To achieve these objectives, the SECP should consider expanding the 
scope of internal and external audits to include legal expertise for 
 
 
 33. The Code, supra note 4, at cls. xxxv and xxxvi. 
 34. See id. cls. xxxvii–xliv. 
 35. Id. cls. xxv, xlv. Clause xxv states: “The Company Secretary of a listed company shall 
furnish a Secretarial Compliance Certificate, in the prescribed form, as part of the annual return filed 
with the Registrar of Companies to certify that the secretarial and corporate requirements of the 
Companies Ordinance, 1984 have been duly complied with.” Clause xlv states: “All listed companies 
shall publish and circulate a statement along with their annual reports to set out the status of their 
compliance with the best practices of corporate governance set out above.” 
 36. Id. pmbl. The preamble states that the Code shall be enforced “for the purpose of establishing 
a frame work of good corporate governance whereby a listed company is managed in compliance with 
best practices.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss2/4
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evaluating a company’s business and affairs from a legal perspective. In 
this respect, the following initiatives should be taken: 
1. One of the independent, non-executive directors should be a 
professional lawyer. Companies may consider retaining the services 
of their legal advisors appointed pursuant to the Companies 
(Appointment of Legal Advisors) Act37 and may, alternatively, be 
deemed to be a member of the Board; 
2. One of the non-executive directors on the audit committee38 
should be a professional lawyer or a legal advisor; 
3. With the assistance of a professional lawyer or legal advisor, the 
audit committee should certify each company’s compliance with all 
applicable laws; and 
4. The audit committee should be empowered to use its legal 
expertise to entertain and resolve grievances lodged by minority 
shareholders as discussed above.  
Additional Measures 
The Code requires directors to “carry out their fiduciary duties with a 
sense of objective judgment and independence in the best interests of the 
company.”39 However, the Code does not define “fiduciary duties.” To 
clarify this provision and improve the effectiveness of its enforcement, the 
SECP should consider listing fiduciary duties. It could borrow from the 
list of fiduciary duties in the Manual of Corporate Governance,40 although 
the SECP does not consider that document binding.41 
In addition, companies should be required to draft and comply with the 
Statement of Ethics and Business Practices.42 To ensure a uniform ethical 
standard, the SECP should provide a general statement setting out 
minimum ethical standards; companies can set higher standards to meet 
their particular needs. To minimize noncompliance, companies should 
have a duty to “comply or explain.” 
 
 
 37. The Companies (Appointment of Legal Advisors) Act, 1974 ¶ 3 (x of 1974). 
 38. The Code, supra note 4, at cl. xxxiii (defining the role of an audit committee). 
 39. Id. cl. vii. 
 40. MANUAL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 13, at 62.  
 41. Id. at i (“[The Manual of Corporate Governance] is for reference only and does not constitute 
any legal requirement on companies, their officers, directors or auditors. This manual may be used for 
guidance and compliance must be ensured with the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.”). 
 42. THE CODE, supra note 4, at cl. viii. 
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FUTURE CHALLENGES 
The most profound issue in corporate governance is how to weigh 
criminal liability for senior executives for non-compliance of mandatory 
disclosure and certification requirements against the constitutional right to 
be free from self-incrimination. For instance, the United States Supreme 
Court prohibits corporate custodians from successfully invoking their Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination when the custodians are 
served with a regulatory subpoena to disclose corporate records.43 Since 
the Pakistan Supreme Court has not made a similar pronouncement, 
corporate representatives may appeal to the privilege against self-
incrimination in this situation. 
As the SECP expands its role in regulating corporate governance, the 
following issues should be considered for formulating future policies:  
1. What are the repercussions of over-institutionalizing internal 
corporate structures by forming committees and sub-committees?  
2. Would externalization of the Board cause cost overruns or greater 
administrative or organizational expenses? If so, what alternatives 
exist to minimize such costs without compromising effectiveness 
and transparency? 
3. Would a good faith presumption in favor of management be 
revoked, and if so, under what circumstances? 
The incorporation of the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance 
and the SECP’s continued work to reform Pakistani markets will lead to 
more effective responses to the challenges highlighted above in this Paper. 
 
 
 43. See generally Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988). 
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